Cenarius
Pro-woman, tree centaur, extremist, hexproof, shadowbanned, empath
Unable to form predictions or tier lists. In love.
🏄🏻♂️ Can’t guarantee I’ll see anything not on XMPP – xmpp:cenarius@conversations.im
- 37 Posts
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Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlOPto
Death to NATO@lemmygrad.ml•Brief Frontline Report – Marat Khairullin [2026-04-09]3·28 days agoPeople should be reading all of these 💯
Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlOPto
China@lemmygrad.ml•250 Years of the Rising Organic Composition of Capital: The Factual Correctness of Marx, Smith, and Keynes – Monthly Review [2026-04-06]
1·1 month agoExpand bibliography
Bank of England. (2024, August). A Millennium of Macroeconomic Data for the UK. Retrieved from bankofengland.co.uk: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets
Barro, R. J., and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004). Economic Growth (Kindle Edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bolt, J., and Zanden, J. L. (2020). Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2020 update (Maddison-Project Working Paper WP-15. Retrieved from https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2020
Broadberry, S., and Pleijt, A. d. (2021, February 27). Capital and Economic Growth in Britain, 1270-1870: Preliminary findings. Retrieved from University of Warwick: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/publications/workingpapers/2021/capital/_and/_economic/_growth/_in/_britain/_1270/_1870/_preliminary/_findings/
Broadberry, S., Campbell, B., Klein, A., Overton, M., and van Leeuwen, B. (2015). British Economic Growth, 1270– 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Erlich, A. (1967). Development Strategy and Planning: The Soviet Experience. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1425
Gallman, R. E., and Rhode, P. W. (2020). Robert Gallman’s Capital Stock Project. In R. E. Gallman, and P. W. Rhode, Capital in the Nineteenth Century. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/capital-nineteenth-century
Gráda, C. Ó. (1979). The population of Ireland 1700-1900: a survey. Annales de démographie historique,, pp. 281-299. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291613400/_The/_population/_of/_Ireland/_1700-1900/_a/_survey
Johnston, L., and Williamson, S. H. (2025, October 21). What Was the U.S. GDP Then? Retrieved October 21, 2025, from MeasuringWorth.com: https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/
Jorgenson, D. W., Gollop, F. M., and Fraumeni, B. M. (1987). Productivity and US Economic Growth. New York: toExcel.
Liang, C.-Y. (2007). “Industry-Wide Total Factor Productivity and Output Growth in Taiwan, 1981–1999.” In D. W. Jorgenson, M. Kuroda, and K. Motohashi (Eds.), Productivity in Asia: Economic Growth and Competitiveness (pp. 146-184). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Lindert, P., and Williamson, J. (2012). American incomes 1774–1860 (Working Paper No. 18396). National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3386/w18396
Maddison Project. (2023). Maddison Project Database 2023. Retrieved from 10.34894/INZBF2
Maddison, A. (1991). Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Maddison, A. (2010). Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD. Retrieved from Angus Maddison (1926-2010): http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm
Marx, K. (1867 Chapter Twenty-Five: The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation). Karl Marx. Capital Volume One. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch25.htm
Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1845 (1976 Edition)). The German Ideology. In K. Marx, and F. Engels, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels Collected Works Vol.5 (1976 ed., Vol. 5, pp. 19-539). Moscow: Progress Publishers.
McCusker, J. F. (n.d.). Colonial Statistics. In S. S. S. B. Carter, Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pyo, H. K., Rhee, K.-H., and Ha, B. (2007). “‘Growth Accounting and Productivity Analysis by 33 Industrial Sectors in Korea (1984-2002)’. In D. W. Jorgenson, M. Kuroda, and K. Motohashi (Eds.), Productivity in Asia: Economic Growth and Competitiveness (pp. 113-145). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Ren, R., and Sun, L. l. (2007). Total Factor Productivity Growth in Chinese industries, 1981-2000. In D. W. Jorgenson, M. Kuroda, and K. Motohashi (Eds.), Productivity in Asia, Economic Growth and Competitiveness (pp. 76-112). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Sutch, R. (2006). National Income and Product. In S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, and M. R. Haineset, Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press.
U.S. Census Bureau. (1975). Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970. Bicentennial Edition. Retrieved from https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/historical-statistics-united- states-237
Xi, J. (2020). Speech at the 28th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on November 23, 2015. Qiushi (16).
Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlOPto
China@lemmygrad.ml•250 Years of the Rising Organic Composition of Capital: The Factual Correctness of Marx, Smith, and Keynes – Monthly Review [2026-04-06]
1·1 month agoExpand notes
[1] Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni 1987, 200. More precisely, Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni found: “The contribution of intermediate input is by far the most significant source of growth in output. The contribution of intermediate input alone exceeds the rate of productivity growth for thirty-six of the forty-five industries for which we have a measure of intermediate input…. If we focus attention on capital and labour inputs, excluding intermediate input from consideration, we find that the sum of contributions of capital and labour inputs exceeds the rate of productivity growth for twenty-nine of the forty-five industries for which we have a measure of productivity growth…the predominant contributions to output growth are those of intermediate, capital and labour inputs. By far the most important contribution is that of intermediate input.”
[2] Pyo, Rhee, and Ha, 2007.
[3] Liang 2007.
[4] Ren & Sun, 2007.
[5] See for example 从210个经济体大数据中,我们发现了中国和世界经济增长的密码 https://www.guancha.cn/LuoSiYi/2024/_10/_05/_750743.shtml.
[6] If shorter time periods were used, the Soviet Union would be included because of its rapid growth in the 1930s—its 6 percent annual average growth from 1929 to 1939 was the fastest of any major economy (calculated from Maddison, 2010). This was accompanied by an internationally unprecedented increase in the share of investment in GDP: “the share of gross investment in the national product (measured at 1937 ruble factor cost) went up from roughly 12 per cent in 1928 to nearly 26 per cent in 1937” (Erlich, 1967). However, Soviet longer-term economic growth was greatly reduced by the catastrophic losses during the Second World War. In the immediate postwar period, Soviet economic growth was again fast, but not as fast as Japan—so the Soviet Union can only be considered the global growth leader in the 1930s.
[7] If the starting data of 1968 is taken then, due to the fall in GDP during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, China’s growth rate would be even higher. However, to avoid any suggestion of artificially increasing rates, here only China’s growth from 1978 onwards is considered.
[8] As Britain was the first modern industrial economy, the processes leading to its early development have been intensively studied. There is debate among historians as to the exact dating of the onset of the Industrial Revolution, of detailed estimates of its economic growth rates, and the percentage of fixed investment in GDP during it—also whether it should be best described as a “revolution” or rather as a more gradual cumulative process. But for present comparative historical purposes, these differences are inconsequential, since all estimates are so low by the standards of a modern economy that they clearly indicate the subsequent historical trend.
[9] In terms of technology, individual examples of what constituted advanced machinery for that period began to be introduced from the early 18th century—machinery being fixed investment. The Newcomen steam engine, the first steam-powered pump, was introduced in 1712, the flying shuttle was introduced in 1733, and the first spinning machine was introduced in 1764. The beginning of the development of steam-powered railways, which required a significantly higher level of capital expenditures, began from 1804. Systematic introduction of machinery into textile production, considered the technological commencement of the Industrial Revolution, began in the last third of the 18th century. Railway construction, entailing a further significant increase in fixed investment, began soon after the start of the 19th century.
[10] Calculating from the data in Bolt and Zanden 2020, measured in 2011 PPPs, the United Kingdom’s GDP in 1820 was 70 billion, compared to 57 billion for France, 51 billion for what became Italy, 50 billion for what became Germany, and 27 billion for the United States. Per capita GDP for the United Kingdom in 1820 was 3,306 compared to 882 for China, a ratio of 3.7:1.
[11] Detailed figures for Britain from the most recent comprehensive studies are used here, but alternative estimates would not alter the qualitative trend relative to subsequent developments.
[12] This process began to occur even before the capitalist revolution of 1642–49, and the sharp increase that occurred during the Industrial Revolution. The percentage of fixed investment in GDP is estimated to have risen from about 1.8–1.9 percent of GDP around 1300 to approximately 2.5 percent of GDP by 1760 as the Industrial Revolution commenced (Broadberry and Pleijt 2021, Figure 5). Strikingly, and equally in line with Marx’s analysis, the proportion of fixed capital relative to working capital also rose during this period.
[13] Broadberry and Pleijt 2021, 23. In detail, the earliest data analysed to obtain a realistic account of the structure of the British economy date from 1688, shortly before the systematic introduction of advanced machinery. The first systematic estimates of investment as a percentage of British GDP during the early phase of this process of industrialization ranged from 2.5 percent to 5 percent, but more recent studies have tended to lower that figure still further (Broadberry and Pleijt 2021). The percentage of domestic investment in British GDP (“Domestic investment = fixed investment + stockbuilding” (Broadberry and Pleijt 2021, 36) then began to rise much more rapidly, from 3.3 percent in the 1760s to 7 percent in the 1790s, then fell slightly during the period surrounding the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with France, before rising again to 7.5 percent in the 1830s, and reaching 10.5 percent by the 1840s (see Figure 4). It then failed to rise significantly above this level for almost one hundred years. The data for the period of the Industrial Revolution is from Broadberry and Pleijt 2021.
[14] Britain had an average annual economic growth rate of 0.6 percent between 1600 and 1700, compared with a Western European average of 0.2 percent – calculated from (Maddison, 2010). Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton, and van Leeuwen 2015 gives a slightly higher estimate of British economic growth in 1600–1700 (0.7 percent), but does not provide a comparable estimate for Western Europe for the same period.
[15] Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton, and van Leeuwen 2015, 199, Table 5.03.
[16]Leaving aside China and India, the largest economies globally after Britain in this period were those of France and what would later become Germany and Italy.
[17] For the U.S. interpolating the data of (U.S. Census Bureau., 1975.) for 1770 and 1780 gives a population of 2.5 million, while (Maddison Project, 2023) gives a GDP per capita in 2011 PPPs of 2,419—giving a total GDP of 6.0 billion. For the UK (Bank of England, 2024) gives the population of Great Britain as 8.21 million while calculating from the data of (Gráda, 1979) gives a population of 4.0 million, while (Maddison Project, 2023) give a per capita GDP of 2,895— a total GDP of 35.4 billion.
[18] Lindert and Williamson 2012, Table 4 shows a decline in 1840 constant dollar prices of per capita real incomes, from $85.26 in 1774 to $68.22 in 1800—i.e., a drop of 20 percent, implying a sharp economic contraction. However, Maddison Project 2023, based on calculation from McCusker and from Sutch 2006 gives, in 2011 PPPs, U.S. per capita GDP of $2,419 in 1775 of and $2,545 in 1800, which implies an extremely slow 0.2 percent annual increase averaged over the period. “38 percent the size of the United Kingdom’s”: calculated from Maddison Project 2023.
[19] Calculated from Maddison Project, 2023.
[20] Calculated from Maddison Project 2023, it was 96 percent higher.
[21] Gallman and Rhode 2020, Table 1.3
[22] From 1868 to 1892, 115,960 miles of railways were constructed—four times the total investment in railway construction and equipment compared to the period from 1840 to 1870. Capital per manufacturing establishment more than doubled from $8,400 in 1870 to $18,400 in 1890 (U.S. Census Bureau 1975.)
[23] Maddison 1991, p. 40.
[24] Calculated from Johnston and Williamson 2025.
[25] For a detailed analysis of this process, see 它曾成功“谋杀”了德国、日本、四小龙,现在想要劝中国“经济自杀.”
[26] See 它曾成功“谋杀”了德国、日本、四小龙,现在想要劝中国“经济自杀.”
[27] Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, 40.
[28] See, for example, 从210个经济体大数据中,我们发现了中国和世界经济增长的密码.
[29] See 从210个经济体大数据中,我们发现了中国和世界经济增长的密码.
[30] For a more detailed analysis of this see 误读提振消费策略,对中国应对美国竞争非常不利. In a Marxist production function, it is part of constant capital, which, with living labor, is one of the two inputs into production, and in “Western” economics, it is, with living labour and total factor productivity (TFP), one of the determinants of production.
[31] For detailed statistics on this, see 从210个经济体大数据中,我们发现了中国和世界经济增长的密码 and 误读提振消费策略,对中国应对美国竞争非常不利.
[32] For the detailed data on this, see 罗一和吉塞拉·塞尔纳达斯:从210个经济体大数据中,我们发现了误解促消费对经济的危害 and 误读提振消费策略,对中国应对美国竞争非常不利.
[33] Marx 1867, Chapter 25: The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation.
[34] Xi 2020.
[35] For a detailed formal analysis of this, see, in particular, Yu Yongding’s 消费驱动还是投资驱动?
Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlto
Capitalism in Decay@lemmygrad.ml•The British origins of the Third Reich’s tank doctrine
2·1 month agoAwesome, adding to shelf
Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlOPto
Palestine@lemmygrad.ml•Yahya al-Sinwar’s “camouflage plan" for Operation al-Aqsa Flood – Mujamma Haraket [2026-03-29]
3·1 month agoIt’s Sinwar’s world we just live in it bruh. It feels awesome. Thank yuo Sinwar 😭
Great thread, wanted to add Chinese military actually started applying the grey filter to some of their videos as a joke. Partly as a bookmark to remind myself to hunt down and save the ones I saw. Anyways it would be funny for it to be appropriated as Regime Filter.
White Eagle Alliance can’t do mafs 😔🧮
Cenarius@lemmygrad.mlto
Open Source@lemmy.ml•Note taking app that I can link between my laptop and phone ?
1·2 months agoLogseq. It works with Markdown or Org. Joplin is fine but I’ve moved away from it for Orgzly Revived + Logseq mobile/Emacs Orgmode + Logseq desktop all integrated with each other to do some stuff Logseq and Orgzly cannot do alone.
You will not find a better option honestly I love my tools. Tried a lot of things and this is one that will grow with you and never overwhelm you if you respect it.
Particularly nice to be able to smoothly turn Logseq/Orgmode stuff into LaTeX stuff and use Emacs Zotero integrations. I can publish professional-level papers and articles of pretty much any kind, from the same system where I work on Minecraft mods and remind myself to do house chores so my wife thinks I am a genius (because I am). I could write an entire textbook with it. It feels like being forced to use a revolver for years, and then switching to an AR platform.
Executing child molestors with missiles is cool and good.
https://annas-archive.pk/md5/ea6c2ecd42016998e92dcd1b5e6e57f2
@Cowbee@lemmy.ml link is identical aside from new domain 👍













(apologies for uncposting i woke up sleepy)