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The […] government asked industrialists to open outlets for their workers, declaring that their prices would be used to calculate the cost-of-living index numbers on which workers’ wages would be assessed. This agreement on the official procedures to collect data on prices was useful to dispel [Fascist] industrialists’ concerns about the possible divergence between production costs and sales prices in the wake of the revaluation of the currency.

To implement the agreement, local bodies, including municipal and provincial authorities, were deprived of any regulatory and statistical competence on consumer prices, but their previous experience in the field was used as a model.

It was the same secretary general of Confindustria, Gino Olivetti (Fasce, 2013), who suggested to Mussolini the opening of outlets for workers like the ones that municipalities had set up during the First World War, which the same Fascist government had closed. Il Duce accepted the idea and, in 1926, asked the industrialists to do what their association had proposed, with the agreement that cost-of-living index numbers would be constructed based on those prices.

From 1927, the Central Statistical Institute (Istituto Centrale di Statistica, ISTAT) constructed cost-of-living index numbers that went on decreasing until 1934, thus justifying the four consecutive wage cuts that the government deliberated.

[…]

Thanks to RDL 222/1927, and to subsequent regulations drawn up by Gini’s ISTAT, the sales of necessities that took place in a few shops, for a minority of working families, could decisively influence cost-of-living index numbers for all Italian workers and, therefore, their wages. It was in fact thanks to this index number calculated by ISTAT, which showed a continuous decrease in consumer prices, that the Fascist government was asked by industrialists to cut the wages of workers with the justification of deflation, thus securing the support of these industrialists, who increased their profits.

The corporatist reorganization of labor markets did not align wages to the ethical and social principles claimed by fascist economists, but rather increased the pressure on wages. The share of capital remained high and increased for most of the period — possibly contributing to consolidate industrialists’ support of the regime. Level, trends, timing: all of the labor share evolution seem to vindicate classic, anti-fascist interpretations. (Gabbuti, 2020, p. 16, emphasis added)

The only scholar of the time who raised explicit and well-grounded doubts about a manipulation of the cost-of-living index numbers carried out by the Fascist state was Gaetano Salvemini, to whom Gabbuti (2020) implicitly refers. Salvemini, a professor of modern history at the university of Florence, was an antifascist close to the left, in exile since 1925, who was appointed professor at Harvard university in 1934 (Moretti, 2017).

In 1936, writing from the united States, Salvemini mentioned the cost-of-living index numbers published by the major [Fascist] cities up to 1926 and pointed out that, following the transfer to ISTAT of their construction and publication, the trend had started a continuous decrease, thus justifying similar reductions in wages:

The index numbers of the cost of living were compiled until the end of 1926 by the municipal governments of the most important cities in Italy, and they were used in the negotiations between employers and employees as a basis for determining wages. In 1921 the industrials began to contest these figures because, they said, they had no means to verify their accuracy. On 20th February 1927, a royal decree entrusted the duty of compiling index figures on the cost of living to the Istituto Centrale di Statistica, which was put under the immediate control of Mussolini. From then on, no wage cuts took place which were not declared to be justified by a decrease in the cost of living. (Salvemini, 1936, p. 256)

[…]

Which actual political effects did the emphasised downward trend in the cost-of-living index have? How was the industrialists’ association indeed able to use it, together with the data on nominal wages, as an argument to claim for further wage cuts to be approved by the government?

With the Law of 3 April 1926, № 563, the Fascist trade unions (redenominated as workers’ corporations) became legally recognised public bodies. The government supervised and controlled the workers’ corporations and had the power to ratify and revoke their leaders. The same corporations were allowed to enter binding employment contracts for the whole category. The right to strike and the right to lock-out were abolished at the same time, because every dispute was entrusted to the labour judiciary, better defined in the subsequent Labour Charter of April 1927 as the Labour Court.

The control of workers’ organisations ensured that the scheme was a fundamental instrument for adjusting wages in the various sectors to the needs of national production through measures of legal value. It thus became possible to guarantee manufacturers a reduction in labour costs to maintain the competitiveness of [Fascist] export products despite the revaluation of the lira, and at the same time to reduce imports by compressing workers’ incomes and thus domestic demand (Toniolo, 1980, pp. 123–126).

This first experiment of forced control of the labour market was not limited to adjusting wages to the lower level reached by prices, but in fact, produced a reduction in their purchasing power. The first wage cut of 10%, proposed in May 1927 by the Fascist unions, was not considered sufficient by the Fascist Party leadership, which in October of the same year fixed at 20% the overall reduction in wage levels (Zamagni, 1976, pp. 337–338).

This correction was based on the trend of ISTAT’s cost-of-living index published since 1927 in the Bollettino mensile di statistica, with reference to the average of the different indexes calculated for 50 [Fascist] cities on the basis of prices charged in the most popular shops, including a significant share of company outlets, for a basket of goods defined by the municipal statistics offices for a family of five relative to the specific consumption habits of each city (ISTAT, 1927, p. 9).

The sharp decrease in the cost of living, thus measured, exceeded the wage reductions agreed upon between Fascist unions and industrialists in 1929. This gap was used by Confindustria in May 1930 to ask the government for a further general cut in wages: the Rivista di politica economica, the house organ of Confindustria, published a note by Roberto Targetti (1930, p. 441) that estimated a 15% decrease in nominal wages between 1926 and May 1930, against a decrease in the cost of living of 20%. Following these claims, a further wage cut of 8%, on average, was granted in November 1930 (Zamagni, 1975, pp. 538–539).

In subsequent years, the rise in unemployment, the adoption of shifts, the reduction of overtime, and a whole series of expedients used by companies to reduce labour costs—from the revision of piecework to the downgrading of qualifications, up to the replacement of elder workers with younger ones and of men with women—brought the level of workers’ incomes to the limit.

In March 1932, the situation was considered untenable by the Fascist unions, so much so that the Central Corporate Council decided not to authorise further wage reductions. Nevertheless, the cuts agreed at the company level continued and gave rise to controversies in the official organ of the Fascist unions, Il lavoro fascista, which polemically highlighted that industrialists seemed convinced that wage reductions could solve any disadvantages deriving from the functional incapacity of a company or an industry (Clavenzani, 1932; Salvemini, 1936, p. 124).

The further drop in the cost of living measured by ISTAT’s index in 1933 justified a final official wage cut of 12% in spring 1934. The introduction of the 40-h week followed in October 1934, thus reducing workers’ earnings even more (Zamagni, 1976, p. 339). From summer 1934 to summer 1936, ISTAT’s cost-of-living index measured a 13% growth in the average level of prices linked to the Ethiopian War, economic sanctions, and the introduction of an autarkic policy. Only in July 1936 did a deliberately lower increase of nominal wages by 8% appear. Subsequent increases of 10% each in April 1937, March 1939, and March 1940 also remained below inflation as measured by the index (Griffon, 1945, pp. 158, 183–185; Zamagni, 1976, pp. 340–341).

Such decisions were based not only on the cost-of-living index but also on an assessment of the actual adjustment of wages to changes decided or agreed upon at the central level, based on companies’ accounts. Confindustria’s initiation, in 1928, of an independent survey extended to all its associates convinced ISTAT to publish in the Bollettino mensile di statistica, from January 1930 on, the hourly earnings of industrial workers as calculated by Confindustria, whose survey was thus given official weight.

In fact, according to the law, the primary criterion in defining the political adjustment of wages had to be the protection of the ‘higher interests of production’ (Law 1926, № 563, art. 16): it thus made sense to take a measure of wages as the cost of a working hour for industrialists and to compare that with the trends in prices that most affected them. A privileged reference to the prices charged in the factory outlets could thus also be justified.

(Emphasis added.)

  • knfrmity@lemmygrad.ml
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    1 month ago

    Let me get this straight: wage decreases were justified by cost of living statistics calculated by prices at company stores?

    Therefore companies would have been incentivized to reduce prices at their stores in order to let the statistics show a low cost of living.